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Abstract
Compared to the various forms of intergovernmental or public-private co-operation, transna-
tional private self-regulation is a rather rarely studied case of global economic governance. 
Furthermore, existing research on transnational self-regulation has neglected the issue of 
corporate governance, which is central to the way capitalism is organised today. Transnational 
private self-regulation, however, appears to be a crucial part of any explanation of current 
changes of national models of corporate governance and, therefore, of the basic organisation 
of economic life. Three features of private self-regulation are singled out for a more detailed 
study, namely credit rating, private codes of  “good corporate governance” and the transna-
tional harmonisation of accounting standards. In all of these cases, co-ordination service ﬁrms 
such as rating agencies, institutional investors and accounting companies play an important 
role as mechanisms for the transnational harmonisation of corporate governance. The paper 
concludes that the increasing role of transnational private self-regulation raises important nor-
mative concerns and, in more particular, asks for the identiﬁcation of alternative agency.
Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at „Global Economic Governance“, confer-
ence of the section for International Relations of the German Political Science Association 
(DVPW) in Arnoldshain, April 10-12, 2003 and at the conference on “International Norms 
for the 21st Century: Political Science, Philosophy, Law” Aix-en-Provence, 11-14 September 
2003. I am grateful to the participants for their helpful comments, especially to Stefan Schirm. 
Furthermore, the paper has very much beneﬁted from the comments of my colleagues at the 
VU, most notably Angela Wigger, Arjan Vliegenthart, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Henk 
Overbeek. 
A revised version of this paper will appear as “Transnational Private Authority and Corpo-
rate Governance”, in: “New Rules for Global Markets: Public and Private Governance in the 
World Economy”, edited by Stefan A. Schirm, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills 2004, 212-
242.
11. Locating transnational private authority in the study of international (economic) 
norms 
Private actors play an increasingly prominent role in the discussion about international 
norms. Traditionally, the development and the implementation of international norms was 
an inter-governmental affair. Most international regimes were based on the cooperation 
between governments only. Over the last decades, the inﬂuence of private actors on decision-
making about these international norms has been noted more frequently, most obviously the 
contribution by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Frequently, international norms now 
are negotiated within transnational policy networks. Within these networks, governments and 
inter-governmental organizations usually retain the ability to make the formal ﬁnal decisions, 
but diverse non-state actors enjoy considerable substantial inﬂuence, based on their substantial 
analytical, ﬁnancial and legitimacy resources. Thus, decision-making within these networks 
may hardly be understood by utilizing state-centric theories of international relations. Instead, 
it has been proposed to analyze these networks as resource exchanges between corporate 
(organizational) actors (Nölke 2000, 2002).
 An even more radical departure from the traditional inter-governmental model lies 
in the evolution of „private authority in international affairs“ (Cutler/Hauﬂer/Porter 1999a), 
which mostly has been studied in the ﬁeld of economic activity. Here, ﬁrms (and other non-
state actors) co-operate transnationally to establish rules and standards of global commerce, 
without directly involving governments at all. Private actors not only formulate norms, but also 
enforce these norms.1 International, or, more precisely, transnational private authority is core 
to a „strong globalization thesis”, i.e. that globalization undermines the authority of the states 
and enhances the demand and capacity of ﬁrms to produce new forms of private authority in 
its place. The discussion on (economic) globalization – as well as the earlier discussion on 
interdependence - traditionally has focused on the question whether and how denationalized 
markets are constraining the ability of national governments to maintain national models 
of economic and social policy. This discussion frequently assumes a declining amount of 
autonomous-making decision capacity on the side of a single national government. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that governments co-operate with each other in order to make up for the loss of 
unilateral problem-solving capacity. Ceteris paribus, governments prefer loose co-operation 
in the form of international regimes, because of the limited loss of authority involved. Under 
certain circumstances, however, they are willing to delegate a higher degree of authority, to 
an international organization or even to the supranational elements of the European Union. In 
other cases, governments do not (only) delegate their authority to inter-governmental entities, 
but also involve private actors such as business and NGOs in decision-making, as in the various 
forms of transnational policy networks. Finally, we observe cases in which governments refrain 
from making decisions, but private actors set and enforce general rules for the global economy 
themselves (transnational private authority). 
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Transnational private authority may be empirically identiﬁed based on three criteria:
“First, those subject to the rules and decisions being made by private sector actors must accept them 
as legitimate, as the representations of experts and those “in authority”. Second, there should exist a 
high degree of compliance with the rules and decisions. Third, the private sector must be empowered 
either explicitly or implicitly (emphasis in original, A.N.) by governments with the right to make 
decisions for others” (Cutler/ Hauﬂer/Porter 1999b: 19).
Thus, private authority should not be confused with private power. The core difference is 
that authority rests on the combination of power and legitimacy:3 “Legitimacy… refers to the 
normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, 
relational between actor and institution, and deﬁned by the actorʼs perception (emphases in 
original, A.N.) of the institution” (Hurd 1999: 381). Power (or inﬂuence), in contrast, may also 
only be based on coercion (Hurd 1999: 400f), resting on military, ﬁnancial or analytical means.4 
Furthermore, private authority also has to be enforced. The mere proclamation of rules and 
principles will not be sufﬁcient. Finally, although private actors make the rules and decisions, 
there is at least an implicit toleration of this authority by public actors. Thus, private authority 
does not necessarily undermine the role of governments – the latter are, at least in principle, 
able to reverse this form of authority allocation.5
Until most recently, the issue of private authority has largely been neglected in the discipline 
of International Relations (IR). The main reason for this negligence is the state-centric bias 
of the discipline, leading to a more or less exclusive focus on governmental actors and inter-
governmental negotiations. As far as non-governmental actors have been taken into account, 
the focus was on the lobbying activities of actors such as NGOs, think tanks and business 
upon decisions ﬁnally taken by governments and inter-governmental entities, whereas self-
regulation by non-governmental actors was not taken into consideration. Similarly, the relevant 
sub-discipline of International Political Economy/IPE has a strong macroeconomic bias. Thus, 
empirical studies mostly focus on issues such as the regulation of ﬁnancial markets, currency 
questions, or the negotiation of international trade agreements. There are much less studies about 
the behavior of business. The only notable exception relates to the research on multinational 
3enterprises. Here, however, the research agenda has largely been narrowed down to the (effects 
of and negotiation over the) allocation of production between home and host countries, with a 
particular focus on developing countries.
 Given this contrast between empirical developments and academic treatment, it has 
been concluded that the issue of private authority on issues such as bond rating is at the cutting 
edge within the discussion on globalization in general and on ﬁnancial markets in particular 
(Cohen 2002:442). This paper concurs that the evolution of private authority is one of the most 
signiﬁcant recent developments in global economic governance. Existing empirical research on 
transnational private authority has not yet realized the overall dimension of this development, 
but has mainly dealt with more peripheral aspects of economic governance (section 2). More 
speciﬁcally, existing research on transnational private authority has largely excluded the 
important issue of corporate governance. Traditionally, this issue - which is central for the 
way capitalism is organized in modern societies – has been dealt with at the national level. 
Transnational private authority, however, appears to be at the core of current pressures for 
convergence of national models of capitalism (section 3). Established theories of IR/IPE are 
unable to deal with the issue of private authority. Furthermore, the development of more 
appropriate theories is in a very early stage, still mostly being limited to broad typologies of 
transnational private authority (section 4). In order to study transnational private authority on 
corporate governance in a more systematical manner, a theoretical framework is constructed 
based on a combination of a transnational policy network approach with a political economy 
perspective on capitalist diversity (section 5). Three features of private authority over questions 
of corporate governance are singled out for a more detailed study, namely the work of rating 
agencies, private codes of “good corporate governance” and the transnational harmonization of 
accounting standards (section 6). The paper concludes that the increasing role of transnational 
private authority for the convergence of different models of capitalism raises important 
normative concerns and, in more particular, asks for the identiﬁcation of alternative agency 
(section 7). Thus, the focus of the paper is on the development of an agenda for further studies, 
based on the identiﬁcation on certain research lacunae, a broadly outlined theoretical approach 
and a ﬁrst cut on empirical developments. This research agenda is based on the hypothesis that 
transnational private authority on corporate governance does not only form an important part of 
global governance, but is also crucially affecting domestic economic systems. Thus, research 
on this type of transnational relations will help us to understand the interface between the global 
political economy and national political economies more thoroughly.
2. State of empirical research on transnational private authority
Although Susan Strange (1996) made wide-ranging claims regarding the increasing role of 
private authority on a global scale, these claims have not yet been matched with systematic 
research. Existing empirical studies very much concentrate on a selected number of issues that 
mostly carry a somewhat peripheral character for the organization of economic activity. Three 
main empirical ﬁelds may be differentiated:
4• voluntary codes for „good corporate conduct“, mainly in terms of human rights and the 
environment (Braun 2001, Hauﬂer 2001, Wolf 2002), are the result of  NGO activism to 
press business to pay more attention to unwelcome side effects of some its activities;
• technical standards in the widest sense are meant to lower transaction costs with regard to 
a number of issues which are not dealt with in much detail by governments, such as the 
governance of the internet (Spar 1999), technical standards in the narrow sense of that term 
(Salter 1999) or private international law/lex mercatoria (Cutler 1999);
• and ﬁnally there is the self-regulation of certain industries such as insurance (Strange 1996: 
chapter 9, Hauﬂer 1997), mineral markets (Webb 1999) or maritime transport (Cutler 
1999).
These studies have been very important to bring the issue of transnational private authority 
on the academic agenda. Furthermore, they have already raised a number of the fundamental 
questions regarding this issue, such as the effectiveness and legitimacy of private self-regulation. 
All of these studies, however, deal with highly speciﬁc features of global economic governance. 
There is no systematical empirical evidence of which sectors and which organizational formats 
are suited at all to host transnational self-regulation (Ronit 2001: 564). Most existing studies 
of transnational private authority focus on cases where only a limited number of industries or a 
selective part of the economic process are being regulated, whereas the fundamental organization 
of economic life is not affected. Furthermore, and somewhat more irritating, private authority 
mostly carries a rather useful, positive character. Most of these studies demonstrate that business 
is able to govern itself and that it can deal with certain negative side effects of economic 
activity. Although there are some critical comments on the legitimacy and accountability of 
the private authority involved most normative assessments more or less obviously focus on the 
efﬁciency of this type of regulation and frequently try to develop proposals to further improve 
this efﬁciency. 
 In contrast to this “mainstream” literature, this paper argues that private authority 
also affects more fundamental aspects of economic governance. Furthermore, conventional 
notions of efﬁciency may be too narrow to assess the impact of this form of regulation. Instead, 
this paper proposes to look at the role of private authority for a fundamental convergence of 
capitalist models. Thus, a more embedded perspective on business activities is being taken, 
relating core elements of economic life to each other. Furthermore, it is also advisable to look at 
the long-term distributive consequences of transnational private authority and at its effects on 
less obvious stakeholders.
3. Corporate governance as a neglected issue of transnational private authority 
(research)
Currently, one of the most important issue areas of transnational private authority appears to be 
in the ﬁeld of corporate governance.6 Corporate governance may be broadly deﬁned as the rules 
and practices governing the power relations between the various stakeholders in the modern 
5corporation: shareholders, creditors, managers, workers, and elements of the society (and the 
state) at large (cf. Hopt et al. 1999: 5, OʼSullivan 2000: 1). Within this conﬁguration three 
sets of relations are central: management-shareholder, management-employee, and company-
society relations. In order to delimit its empirical scope, the focus of this paper is on shareholder 
relations: Relations between shareholders and management are at the heart of the quintessential 
struggle over ownership and control (Becht et al 2002; Berle and Means 1932/1991).  
 Management – shareholder relations in turn consist of three major components. Here, 
we follow the common distinction between exit and voice (Hirschman 1970) or between 
external – through the market for corporate control and evaluation – and internal – through the 
governing structure of the corporation itself – mechanisms of control (Jensen 1993). The third 
key issue is that of transparency and accountability, the regulation of which is highly relevant 
to both internal and external dimensions. We thus arrive at the following three key instances of 
corporate governance regulation:
- the internal governance structure of the ﬁrm;
- the external control and evaluation of the ﬁrm and
- regulation affecting transparency and accountability.
Corporate governance has in the 1990s become a buzzword of the global business community 
and is now receiving even wider attention given the worldwide economic, societal and political 
repercussions of the Enron collapse and other recent corporate disasters. In a broader perspective, 
corporate governance is a core element of major models of capitalism such as the Anglo-Saxon 
and the Rhenish ones. Here, the central debate is on the question whether we witness a process 
of convergence of different types of corporate governance and, therefore, of types of capitalism. 
Although this debate is far from being settled, there appear to be strong transnational pressures 
to change the structure of corporate governance within the Rhenish model of capitalism. Given 
that Germany is the prototype for this model, it is at the focus of most empirical studies. Based 
on a wave of recent research on corporate governance in Germany, there is by now abundant 
evidence for radical changes within this governance structure (cf. Deeg 2002). Changes in 
corporate governance, however, may have far-reaching consequences for the capitalist model as 
a whole (cf. Nölke 1998, 1999). Core comparative advantages of the Rhenish model traditionally 
are the fairly balanced and consensual relationship between labor and capital and the availability 
of patient capital being provided by major banks (“Hausbanken”) and internally generated funds. 
Management has to meet an arrangement with well-organized representatives of both labor and 
capital, which often participate directly in the decision-making process. Thus, these decision-
making processes may take a long time, but the implementation of jointly made decisions is 
comparatively smooth. Moreover, the Rhenish model of corporate ﬁnance leads to a relatively 
long-term perspective with regard to the economic well-being of ﬁrms. “Hausbanken” are less 
interested in short-term price movements on the stock markets than in the long-term solvency of 
their loans. The same long-term perspective applies to other sources of investment capital. At the 
same time, stable ownership structures provide ﬁrms with considerable protection against take-
6over. All of these factors also support the long-term investment in human resource development 
that is crucial for the Rhenish specialization in high skill and high quality products. These 
comparative advantages may now, however, be undermined by a shift of corporate governance 
structures in favor of shareholders. This may, in turn, lead to the familiar “… pressures of 
“short-terminism” that plague American and British companies – pressure from shareholders to 
maximize dividends by concentrating on quarterly results and short-range return on investment 
variables” (Sally 1995: 69), and to a more conﬂictive relationship with the representatives of 
labor. Radical changes in corporate governance structures, therefore, may threaten the very 
basis of the Rhenish capitalist model, because its elements are highly interdependent and may 
not be easily transferred and exchanged. 
 Some observers applaud these recent developments, since they assume that the Rhenish 
model is systematically underperforming, if compared with its Anglo-Saxon rival. Still, further 
erosion of the Rhenish model appears to be problematic, not only from a labor perspective. 
Even if the Anglo-Saxon model is assumed to be generally more efﬁcient, a selective transfer 
of the US system of corporate governance into the German system of capitalism hardly appears 
to be promising, given the strong interdependencies between the different elements of national 
systems of capitalism. Thus, the selective “disembedding” of single mechanisms of national 
models of capitalism for a transfer into another national model has rarely proved to be an 
attractive perspective, as several attempts to export the German system of apprenticeship have 
demonstrated.7 The alternative of the Rhenish model completely shifting towards the Anglo-
Saxon model of capitalism would, however, appear equally unattractive (at least in the short 
and medium-term), given the inability of the Rhenish model to compete in simple low-cost 
products on the one hand and products which demand high short-term investments in more 
risky business ventures on rapidly changing markets on the other. Thus, the disembedding of 
Rhenish corporate governance may lead to a loss of its comparative advantages in high skill 
and high quality products, without providing an attractive reform perspective. This would not 
only be to the disadvantage of Germany (and other “Rhenish” countries), but also to the overall 
welfare of capitalist societies:
“To the extent that national or other institutional speciﬁties serve as niches allowing ﬁrms and 
economies to develop competitive new products and processes, their disappearance must diminish 
the aggregate entrepreneurial creativity and vitality of capitalism as a system. It is furthermore 
highly unlikely that any one approach to running a capitalist economy will monopolize all the virtues 
– which would seem to offer good Popperian, or even Hayekian, reasons for seeking to preserve 
the innovative potential inherent in a healthy level of ʻsocio-diversity  ʼwithin global capitalism” 
(Crouch/Streeck 1997b: 15). 
 
Whereas ongoing changes within continental corporate governance systems (and their 
implications for the Rhenish model as a whole) are well documented by now, there is, however, 
far less evidence on the transnational forces that support these changes. Most research on 
7corporate governance – and on its embeddedness in the more general “varieties of capitalism” – 
is strictly comparative, thus excluding the transfer mechanisms between (national) models (cf., 
e.g., Crouch/Streeck 1997a, Hall/Soskice 2001). Within remaining research, the conventional 
explanation of the evolution of transnational convergence of corporate governance focuses on 
the functional requirements of liberalized markets (cf. OʼSullivan 2000,Weil/Gotshal/Manges 
2002). Furthermore, competing substantial claims are mostly being discussed in a technical 
manner, assuming that standards are mainly a question of the most (market-) efﬁcient solution. 
This explanation is at least incomplete, given the remaining diversity of corporate governance 
models and the fact that a number of potential movements towards convergence are highly 
controversial political issues. As far as there is a political explanation, authors focus on the role 
of national governments and, most prominently, the European Union as the dominant transfer 
mechanisms for corporate governance standards (e.g. Bieling/Steinhilber 2002). Issues such as 
ﬁnancial liberalization or European Company Law are at the forefront. 
 In contrast, this paper argues that politically less visible, but potentially more important 
developments are happening within the private sector, especially in the wider context of the 
ﬁnancial markets. First, there is a comparatively limited role of public regulation on issues of 
corporate governance. Market developments are very dynamic. Dominant actors prefer to keep 
governments out of this issue area, because a homogeneous regulation might not do justice to 
the complexity of situations involved. Furthermore, international public regulation of corporate 
governance is frequently being blocked because of the high national stakes involved, as in 
the cases of European Company Law or the Take-over Directive. As far as we can still ﬁnd 
successful public regulation in this sector, it is largely based on private self-regulation. Thus, 
the European Union, e.g., requires business to adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
by 2005. Finally, there are private actors that are very actively promoting a convergence of 
corporate governance (towards the Anglo-Saxon model) on their own, such as institutional 
investors and rating agencies. In sum, effects of transnational private authority may be a crucial 
part of any explanation for current changes in corporate governance and, thus, for the basic 
organization of economic life. 
4. State of theories on transnational private authority
As mentioned before, established (mainstream) theories of IR/IPE are unable to address the issue 
of transnational private authority, because of their state-centric bias. Existing theories on private 
self-regulation on the national level (e.g., Streeck/Schmitter 1985) may only to a limited extent 
be transferred to the transnational level, because they are frequently linked to certain features 
of corporatism which are absent outside of the domestic context (especially the participation of 
labor). Correspondingly, the development of theories on transnational private authority is still 
in an early stage. Due to the absence of links with established theories, conceptual development 
very much follows an inductive approach. Thus, broad classiﬁcations and typologies of different 
forms and mechanisms of transnational private authority such as informal industry norms, 
8coordination service ﬁrms, production alliances, cartels or private regimes dominate the ﬁeld 
(cf. Cutler/Hauﬂer/Porter 1999b).8 Furthermore, there are some rather general explanations 
regarding the emergence and the operating principles of transnational private authority (cf. 
Cutler/Hauﬂer/Porter 1999c). For some very speciﬁc cases of transnational private authority, 
such as rating agencies, more elaborate theoretical models are being developed (cf., e.g., Kerwer 
2001), without, however, being placed in a more comprehensive, comparative perspective. 
Although both the problem solving as well as the legitimacy dimensions of the evolution of 
transnational private authority have been highlighted, there is as yet no systematical theoretical 
reﬂection on how to assess these normative implications.
 In an over-all perspective, the current state of theory development on transnational 
private authority is not yet satisfactory. Broad typologies are a valuable option for early theory 
development, but have to be complemented by more advanced approaches focusing on the 
explanation of the working of transnational private authority as well as on the precise conditions 
under which this element of global governance is relevant. Furthermore, the normative focus 
of existing theories may be too narrow and too ahistorical. In order to assess the implications 
and desirability of transnational private authority within global economic governance, we have 
to embed this phenomenon into a more general and historical perspective of economic activity. 
Finally, it may be wise not to attempt to design a general theory of transnational private authority 
at once, but rather focus on a speciﬁc sub-category ﬁrst, and then move on to other categories. 
This could help to overcome not only the conceptual limitation of mere typologies (which 
frequently go hand in hand with a too broad approach), but also the risk of an idiosyncratic 
approach based on only one case of transnational private authority. 
5. Elements of an alternative approach: Transnational policy networks and the varieties 
of capitalism
One promising point of departure for conceptual development is the resource dependency 
theory on transnational policy networks (cf. Nölke 2000). In marked contrast to conventional 
theories of international relations, this approach gives considerable space to the activities of 
private actors. Transnational policy networks, however, focus on public-private interaction and 
on policy advocacy or on policy participation of private actors at most, but not on private 
self-regulation (cf. Porter/Coleman 2002: 3). The degree of private inﬂuence on governmental 
or inter-governmental decisions, which is a good indicator for the relevance of transnational 
(global) policy networks, misses therefore the point as far as private self-regulation is concerned. 
Furthermore, policy network approaches are quite weak on political economy issues. Thus, they 
are unable to identify the larger picture and the signiﬁcance of socio-economic changes that may 
be caused by transnational private authority, as well as the historical context that has given birth 
to this type of authority. Here, we can draw on theories of capitalist diversity (Crouch/Streeck 
1997a, Hall/Soskice 2001), which are weak on the analysis of transnational governance, but 
strong on the overall relevance of current and historical developments for the organization of 
capitalist economies.
9 As a concrete analytical instrument an (inter-) organizational approach is chosen, since 
single ﬁrms and their inter-organizational networks appear to be at the center of most forms 
of transnational private authority. Thus, the issue of transnational private authority is phrased 
in terms of a network of private organizations which are able to transnationally inﬂuence the 
conduct of other private organizations, inter alia based on legitimacy accepted by the latter 
and on a more or less implicit empowerment of (inter-) governmental actors. Sociological 
approaches on resource dependencies in inter-organizational networks (cf. Nölke 1995: 72-85) 
may serve as a starting point for the analysis of relationships between single companies, but 
have to be embedded in more general concepts of political economy. Thus, these organizations 
are representing the interests of different socio-economic groups, such as managers, (various 
categories of) shareholders and employees. Policy networks assume that political decision-
making and implementation is mainly based on the exchange of material and immaterial 
resources between mutually – but frequently asymmetrically – dependent organizations. Typical 
resources to be exchanged in policy networks include ﬁnance, information and legitimacy (cf. 
Nölke 1995: 98f). Within the framework of transnational private authority in global economic 
governance, legitimacy appears to be a core resource, but will always be combined with more 
conventional power resources such as ﬁnance and information.9 The outcome of resource 
exchanges in a transnational political economy perspective, however, may very much transcend 
the corporate actors involved in these exchanges, given the potentially far-reaching relevance 
of private corporate governance standards for the organization of capitalist economies as a 
whole. In order to analyze these outcomes, the organizational logic of policy networks thus 
has to be combined with a comprehensive (transnational) political economy perspective. The 
same logic applies to the preconditions for the evolution of transnational private authority that 
also can only be properly understood in the context of the historical development of capitalist 
economies.
6. Coordination service ﬁrms and corporate governance
The activities of so-called „coordination service ﬁrms“ (Cutler/Hauﬂer/Porter 1999b: 10f) such 
as rating agencies, institutional investors, trade exchanges, investment banks, multinational 
law, accounting, insurance and management consultancy ﬁrms are at the core of transnational 
private authority on corporate governance. Recently, the Enron (and Worldcom etc.) debacle has 
demonstrated the importance of these institutions for corporate governance. Therefore, this type 
of transnational private authority is singled out for a more in-depth study. The basic assumption 
is that these ﬁrms by setting and enforcing standards of company behavior enjoy considerable 
authority over other ﬁrms – and, correspondingly, over more general issues of socio-economic 
governance. Thus, private actors take over (regulatory) roles, which traditionally are held by 
governments, with far-reaching consequences. 
 Based on the theoretical discussion outlined above, the remainder of the paper will 
undertake a ﬁrst cut of empirical developments in these ﬁelds, in order to give an assessment of 
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the importance of this type of private transnational authority for global economic governance. 
Corresponding to the three key instances for corporate governance regulation mentioned above, 
the paper will focus on three groups of coordination service ﬁrms:
• Institutional investors develop (and enforce) codes of conduct for the internal corporate 
governance structures of listed companies;
• rating agencies assess the value of bonds issued by ﬁrms and other institutions, thereby 
inducing certain types of business behavior and
• major accounting ﬁrms favor certain standards of transparency and accountability over 
others, thus affecting the ﬁnancial management of listed companies.
6.1. Institutional investors and internal corporate governance structures10 
The evolution of codes of conduct for corporate governance has considerably intensiﬁed during 
the last years – out of the 35 codes currently existing in the EU Member States, 25 have been 
issued since 1997 (Weil/Gotshal/Manges 2002: 2). Although there are a number of competing 
standards, there also has been a strong tendency towards substantial convergence. Remaining 
differences primarily reﬂect the strong historical association of corporate governance systems 
with different (national) models of capitalism. Furthermore, public authorities, on the national, 
European and global level have endorsed some private standards. Thus, codes of conduct on 
corporate governance have become enmeshed in a complex web of multi-level governance. 
Given the dominance of economic and legal literature on corporate governance, the political 
struggle behind this evolution of private authority is largely unaccounted for. The most 
important driving force for the development and enforcement of these codes, however, appear 
to be institutional investors. The term institutional investor generally refers to “… an investor 
with money under professional management in an organization that invests on behalf of a group 
of individuals, another organization, or a group of organizations” (Brancato 1997: 21). In the 
US, the most important investors are mutual funds and pension funds. In the last few decades, 
the importance of these investors vis-à-vis individual investors has increased rapidly. The share 
of institutional investors in terms of all US ﬁnancial assets rose from 8,4% in 1950 to 12,3% 
in 1970, and further to 20,5% in 1990 (Harms 1997: 15). Whereas in 1965 84% of all US 
industry shares were owned by individual investors (and 16% by institutional investors), in 
1990 individual investors held only 54% (as opposed to 46% by institutional investors) (ibid, 
p. 21). This accumulation of shares leads to a considerable concentration of power within the 
hands of institutional investors which is further intensiﬁed by a comparatively high degree 
accumulation of assets in the hand of a few, rather large investors. 
 Since the early 1980s, this concentration process has led to a very active role of 
institutional investors in terms of corporate governance. Accordingly, institutional investors no 
longer limit themselves to the option of exiting, selling their shares if they are not satisﬁed with 
the share development of a certain company, but use the voice option and directly inﬂuence 
corporate governance. To be sure, the classical system of operation on the basis decisions to 
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sell (“The Wall Street Walk”) had also had an effect on corporate governance. Yet these effects 
were largely limited to a more indirect, structural inﬂuence, whereas the exercise of direct, 
active inﬂuence on management decisions remained rather rare, in comparison to the more 
recent, active behavior. This behavior has, inter alia, become necessary due to the increasing 
concentration of shares of a particular company with a particular institutional investor – if the exit 
option is chosen and shares are sold in large numbers, a downturn of prices now is unavoidable. 
In terms of internal corporate governance structures, institutional investors increasingly have 
put pressure on the companies they (partially) own, especially in comparison to the more 
passive approach of atomized individual investors. Typical issues include altering the structure 
and election practices of a companyʼs board of directors, splitting the roles of chairman and 
chief executive, increasing current dividend payments and altering executives  ʼand directors  ʼ
compensation packages. The ﬁnancial resources of institutional investors are complemented by 
the legitimacy that these organizations and their associations have accumulated as the leading 
experts on questions of internal corporate governance standards. Recommendations, which 
were developed by organizations of the movement for “institutional activism” such as the 
Council of Institutional Investors (CII) or the Investors  ʼRights Association of America (IRAA), 
are accepted as basis for the collective enforcement of corporate governance standards. These 
general guidelines are complemented by the accumulation of intelligence on companies with 
deviant behavior (cf. Brancato 1997: chapter 3).
 More recently, (US) institutional investors are slowly beginning to transnationalize their 
investments. While the principal US institutions making foreign equity investments (i.e. pension 
funds and mutual funds) increased their foreign equity holdings from $97,5 billion in 1990 to 
$ 281,7 billion in 1994, this represents an aggregate increase in pension fund assets devoted 
to foreign equities from 3,1 percent in 1990 to only 5,5 percent in 1994, and an increase in 
mutual fund assets from 1,7 percent to 3,9 percent (Brancato 1997: 127). According to the long-
term policy statements of many US institutional investors, an expansion of the international 
component of their shareholding portfolios towards a 20 percent share is to be expected (Black 
et al. 1998: 201). The repercussions of this transnationalization process are already to be felt 
within other economies.11 International institutional investors already by 1997 held shares of 
around 20 percent and more in some of the most important German ﬁrms (Siemens 18%, RWE 
19%, BASF 27%, Hoechst 51%; all ﬁgures taken from Balzer/Nölting 1997). Furthermore, the 
assets of German investment funds are also growing rapidly – in 1996 they amounted to DM 
62,5 billion, more than ﬁve times the amount in 1991 (BVI 1997: 10).
 The transnationalization of institutional investing is not limited to the acquisition 
of shares, but also comprises of investor activism. Thus, German investment funds, while 
mostly being administered by German banks, increasingly differ from the traditionally more 
reluctant behavior of their parent companies. They are not only beginning to issue general 
guidelines for changes in corporate governance of German companies, but also take a more 
critical stance at the general meetings of individual German ﬁrms where they hold shares (cf. 
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Balzer/Nölting 1997: 80). Still, they have not yet reached the more aggressive behavior of 
their US counterparts, such as the famous California Public Employees  ʼRetirement System 
(CalPERS). CalPERS and other institutional investors have teamed up in institutions such as 
the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) in order to aggressively challenge 
traditional practices of corporate governance in Germany and other countries with deviate 
from the Anglo-Saxon model (cf. Balzer/Nölting 1997: 88f). Typical issues of concern include 
voting rights of shareholders, executive remuneration or the composition of corporate boards. 
Given the absence of binding public regulations on internal corporate governance structures, 
these networks play a core role in developing and enforcing private or semi-private corporate 
governance codes. These codes increasingly deﬁne what the global business community 
considers adequate corporate governance. Correspondingly, a large part of recent changes in 
German (and other continental) corporate governance mechanisms has been attributed to the 
activities of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors and their networks (cf. Lannoo 1999: 287-290, 
Ciofﬁ 2000: 585, Detomasi 2001: 20-28).
 The basic mechanism of transnational private authority of institutional investors over 
internal corporate governance structures consists of the pooling of their analytical, ﬁnancial and 
legitimacy resources. These assets are then used to exploit the dependency of other companies 
on these resources, e.g. by issuing guidelines for correct corporate governance, selling shares, 
and using voting rights or publishing lists of companies with deviating corporate governance 
practices. Given the existence of a multitude of corporate governance codes and of an even 
greater variety of institutional investors, their ability to exercise transnational private authority 
has, however, not yet been optimized.
6.2 Rating agencies and external evaluation
Debt rating agencies work towards the same direction of spreading Anglo-Saxon standards of 
corporate governance, although through a somewhat different mechanism. They exercise their 
authority in two manners (cf. King/Sinclair 2001: 4): On the one side, they shape the behavior 
of market participants by limiting thinking to a range of legitimate possibilities. On the other, 
less frequent side, they may even occasionally exercise an explicit veto over certain options, by 
using a ratings downgrade. Rating agencies have received the most attention for their evaluation 
of public institutions, because this assessment forms one of the most obvious cases of political 
relevance of transnational private authority (cf. Hillebrand 2001). Although the proper task of 
rating agencies is to assess the “quality” of other companies  ʼ(and public institutionsʼ) debts, 
they also have inﬂuence on issues of corporate governance, since the latter form an important 
element of their assessment criteria for business enterprises. Furthermore, both the authority of 
institutional investors and of rating agencies are the product (and core elements) of an ongoing 
(US-led) process of the disintermediation of ﬁnance, which is leading to an decreasing role of 
commercial banks for the provision of capital (cf. King/Sinclair 2001: 5-8). Insofar that the 
epistemic authority of rating agencies favors the US system of disintermediated ﬁnance, it is 
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not politically neutral, but rather actively favors a speciﬁc socio-economic model which is very 
much in line of the short-term investment horizon of the Anglo-Saxon approach (Sinclair 1994: 
149).
 The resource base of rating agencies is somewhat different from the one used by 
institutional investors. Whereas the authority of the latter is mainly based on their ﬁnancial 
resources (and on their legitimacy as standard-setters for internal corporate governance 
structures), rating agencies derive their authority from their analytical resources (and the 
legitimacy that is derived from the expert character of these analytical resources in the perception 
of market participants). The demand for the analytical output of rating agencies stems from the 
overwhelming quantity of information available to market actors. Rating agencies condense 
this information into some sort of recommendation, which is then used as a benchmark for other 
market actors. Although the latter may depart from these marks, they still are the standards 
for the work of other actors (King/Sinclair 2001: 4f). Analytical resources (and the related 
legitimacy), however, are somewhat more unstable than ﬁnancial resources, since they may be 
severely affected by perceived rating miscalls. Thus, the reputation as global experts for debt 
quality, which has been accumulated by rating agencies over decades, may be eroded quickly, 
as indicated by the Mexico crisis and the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of the 1990s (King/Sinclair 
2001: 10). Resource dependencies between rating agencies and other business companies exist 
not only in case of institutional investors, but also with the companies whose debts are rated 
by these agencies. It is here that rating agencies exercise their main authority over corporate 
governance, since most companies cannot afford a low ranking and will therefore consider to 
adjust their corporate governance structures, if these give concern to a rating agency. Although 
based on less tangible resources than the ones available to institutional investors, the authority 
of rating agencies over the basic organization of capitalist economies should not be underrated. 
Even if a company that is issuing a bond does not agree with a particular rating, it has to take 
account of other market actors that will be acting upon that particular rating (King/Sinclair 
2001:11). 
 Compared with institutional investors, rating agencies are considerably assisted in their 
exercise of transnational private authority by a far higher concentration within this business 
sector. Although there is intensiﬁed competition and an increasing number of agencies since the 
1990s, the two major agencies of Moodyʼs Investor Service (Moodyʼs) and Standard&Poorʼs 
(S&P) still largely dominate the market. Other agencies rather occupy niche markets, such as 
Fitch Ratings for municipal and ﬁnancial institutions. The dominating role of Moodyʼs and S&P 
is not limited to the US. It is their transnational authority over European and Asian market actors, 
which has caused the most controversy (King/Sinclair 2001: 12). This controversy has been 
intensiﬁed by the Basle II capital adequacy proposals, which mandate rating agency outputs for 
less sophisticated banks (cf. King/Sinclair 2001: 17-25). As in case of the semi-public corporate 
governance codes being elaborated by institutional investors, private authority here becomes 
enmeshed in a public-private system of multi-level governance. Third-party enforcement of debt 
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rating has a long history in the US (cf. Kerwer 2001, King/Sinclair 2001: 14-17), but now goes 
global. These most recent developments have not only been criticized because of a number of 
practical problems involved, but also because they may further undermine the Rhenish model, 
in this case especially the ﬁnancial basis of some “Mittelstand” companies.
6.3 Accounting companies and transparency standards
Both institutional investors and rating agencies rely upon accounting companies for accurate 
information about the performance of business. Without proper accounting ﬁgures, neither 
bond-rating nor institutional investing may be done in an acceptable manner. Regulations 
of transparency and accountability are a core element of corporate governance. In contrast 
to institutional investors and rating agencies, the role of accounting companies within the 
(transnational) political economy of modern capitalism has hardly been studied yet. Still, 
the potential of accounting companies for the development of powerful transnational private 
authority has already been indicated by Susan Strangeʼs seminal study on the “Retreat of the 
State” (1996, chapter 10). Strange focused on the extreme concentration of the accountancy 
market, where the Big Six (in the meantime the Big Four) had market shares of more than 95 
per cent in the most important national markets, thereby giving them considerable structural 
power.
 Even more important than the structural power of the big accountancy companies 
observed by Susan Strange may be the authority conferred by the elaboration of transnational 
private accounting standards. Traditionally, accounting standards have been developed on the 
national level, in most cases with a strong involvement of national governments. Economic 
transnationalization and the disintermediation of ﬁnance, however, have recently asked for a 
harmonization of national standards. Accounting companies are also in favor of pooling their 
resources in transnational standard setting bodies, since this will strengthen their position towards 
national regulators and single clients. Transnational harmonized accounting standards are also 
important for the legitimacy resource base of the whole profession, because it increasingly 
becomes obvious that different (national) standards lead to dramatically different results for the 
same company (Sundgren 1997: 15). In the absence of inter-governmental co-operation for the 
regulation of the accountancy profession, the shift of standard setting to the transnational level 
leads to a further case of the evolution of powerful transnational private authority over issues 
of corporate governance. In contrast, the importance of national public regulations, such as the 
German Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), is being tremendously eroded.
 Given the dominance of professional literature within accounting studies, the political 
struggle behind this evolution of private authority is yet largely unaccounted for, although 
transnational private accounting regulations are not only very much contested, but also the basis 
for international public regulation. The ﬁrst substantial attempts for cross-border harmonization 
of accounting regulations have already been undertaken in the early 1970s. During the 1990s, 
the controversy between the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) of the US, the 
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transnational International Accounting Standards (IAS) (or International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as they are called more recently) set by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and various national standards in Europe has dominated the issue area. Numerous 
European companies have applied the GAAP to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Outside of the US, the London-based IAS/IFRS have increasingly been adopted. Recently, the 
EU has decided that European companies have to adapt the (private) IAS standard by 2005. In 
the aftermath of Enron, even US authorities consider the acceptance of (some of) these rules.  
Conventional explanations of the evolution of private authority on accounting focus on the 
functional requirements of liberalized markets for the harmonization of standards. Furthermore, 
competing substantial claims are mostly being discussed in a technical manner, assuming that 
standards are mainly a question of the most (market-) efﬁcient solution. From the perspective 
of this paper, however, these standard-setting procedures have to be understood within the 
context of the variety of capitalist models and the concrete interests of different socio-economic 
groups. Thus, the rather conservative, debtor-oriented accounting standards of the German 
(HGB) may, e.g., be explained by the strong role of the German banks during the evolution 
of this model of capitalism. The complex, case-oriented structures of the US GAAP are, inter 
alia, due to the lobbying efforts and the evasive behavior of US companies in diverse economic 
sectors. Since accounting standards are not neutral towards different models of capitalism, 
transnational standard setting may severely threaten established practices on the national 
level. Increasing importance of transnational accounting standards, thus, recently led to the 
foundation of a German committee for accounting standards (Deutsches Rechnungslegungs 
Standards Committee/ DRSC) by major German companies, with the prime intention of 
participating in international standard development. As of 27 March 2003, this committee has 
already been severely reorganized, in order to improve its ability to inﬂuence the setting of 
private transnational accounting standards, which so far has been fairly limited. Again, private 
authority based on Anglo-Saxon preferences is increasingly undermining the Rhenish model - in 
this case the long-term perspective of German business based on considerable hidden reserves 
that will be made more difﬁcult through the increased application of transnational accounting 
standards. 
7. Conclusion and issues for further research
All three types of coordination service ﬁrms favor a convergence of corporate governance 
standards towards the Anglo-Saxon model, although the case of accounting also demonstrates 
that there may be considerable differences between British and US approaches. Still, it has to 
be established whether coordination service ﬁrms (and other mechanisms) will lead to a full-
scale convergence, or only a modiﬁcation of the Rhenish model. All three types of coordination 
service ﬁrms have considerably gained in importance through the process of disintermediation 
of ﬁnance during the last decades. A more in-depth explanation of the reasons why these ﬁrms 
have become important and why they are pressing for a convergence on the Anglo-Saxon model 
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therefore has to take account of this process of disintermediation and the accompanying shift of 
power between different elements of capitalist political economies.
 More speciﬁcally, one decisive factor for the success of transnational private authority 
in the ﬁeld of accounting and even more so in the ﬁeld of bond rating appears to be the high 
concentration within the market. This concentration very much assists the development and 
enforcement of common standards within a small group of organizations. The same principle 
is to be detected in case of institutional investors, but here concentration is still too limited in 
order to make a set of common standards easily available. In all cases, transnational private 
authority is based on the resource dependencies of other companies. These dependencies may 
be based on the ﬁnancial resources of institutional investors, or for the information, which is 
provided, by accounting and rating companies. All three types of coordination service ﬁrms 
furthermore enjoy considerable legitimacy resources as standard setters for different aspects of 
corporate governance. In all three cases, ﬁnally, coordination service ﬁrms have received some 
backing from the state or by inter-state cooperation.
 The studies cited so far, however, have not yet been matched by investigations in other 
types of coordination service ﬁrms, such as transnational law or management consultancy 
companies and stock exchanges. Therefore, it still has to be established whether these 
observations are valid for further types of coordination service ﬁrms or other mechanisms 
of transnational private authority in more general. Furthermore there is as yet little reﬂection 
of the interrelationships between different mechanisms. Institutional investors, e.g., rely on 
rating agencies and on accountancy companies for their investment decisions (Hillebrand 2001: 
161). Correspondingly, one may assume that these agencies co-ordinate their efforts for the 
implementation of Anglo-Saxon standards within alternative capitalist environments with each 
other.  In order to establish ﬁrmly the actorness of these coordination service ﬁrms, it also has 
to be demonstrated that alternative courses of action – in terms of investment criteria, rating 
standards, accounting rules etc. - are possible. Otherwise, these ﬁrms are only the „implementing 
agencies“ of anonymous market pressures, and thus of very limited relevance. Correspondingly, 
further research may search for an alternative network of institutional investors, rating agencies 
and other coordinating ﬁrms, such as labor-dominated pension funds (Blackburn 1999), socially 
responsible investing (Guay/Jansons 2002) or alternative rating concepts focusing on social/
political stability (Hillebrand 2001: 169f). 
 The existence of an alternative to the dominating form of transnational private authority 
also becomes relevant from the perspective of the adaptability of the Rhenish model of 
capitalism, since this model is fundamentally at odds with the prerogatives of the established 
transnational coordination service ﬁrms. There are obvious considerations – already made by 
others – that some aspects of this type of private authority are problematic, e.g. the collusion 
between coordination service ﬁrms of different sectors/functions as in the case of cross-selling 
between accountants and management consultants within one auditing company. The utilization 
of private authority for public regulation as in the case of the involvement of rating agencies 
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within the Basle II capital adequacy proposals has also been severely criticized (cf. King/Sinclair 
2001:17-25). These conclusions, however valid, remain within the narrow concern of short-term 
economic efﬁciency. Other observers have added that it is difﬁcult to combine the existence 
of transnational private authority with conventional notions of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability (cf. Wolf 2002). In a broader perspective, however, the inﬂuence of transnational 
private authority on a possible convergence of capitalist diversity towards an Anglo-Saxon 
model may be the most pressing policy issue.
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Notes
1 The high degree of compliance with transnational private authority (Cutler/Hauﬂer/Porter 1999b: 19) distinguishes 
this more speciﬁc case from the more general concept of private transnational norms. In contrast to norms that 
are established by public actors, private norms are generally far more difﬁcult to be enforced. Therefore, private 
authority is a rare and important case of the wider universe of private norms. In the remainder of this paper, the 
focus will for this reason be on the more speciﬁc concept of authority.
2 Regional integration schemes vary very much in their degree of delegation of authority by national governments. 
With its supranational elements, the EU shows the highest degrees of delegation. Other regional integration 
schemes are more similar to international regimes. Also within the EU, the authority of single governments varies 
signiﬁcantly between the pillars and the procedures for decision-making. Finally, EU decision-making frequently 
is similar to transnational public policy networks, with a high degree of involvement of private actors, cf. Nölke 
2003
3 For a similar deﬁnition of transnational private authority as based on power combined with legitimacy see Hall/
Biersteker 2002: 4. 
4 Private authority should also not be confused with Nyeʼs concept of “soft power” or Strangeʼs “structural power”. 
Besides the conceptual woolliness of the latter concepts (cf. Baldwin 2002: 184f, 186), both do not necessarily 
comprise of a combination of power and legitimacy. Thus, private authority may also be based on structural power 
(besides relational power) as well as on Nyeʼs intangible resources (besides tangible resources such as information 
and ﬁnance) – but always has to include legitimacy.
5 In some cases, private actors may even have authority over public actors, as in case of rating agencies and their 
“sovereign” ratings (Hillebrand 2001: 165-167). The focus of this article, however, is on self-regulation within the 
private sector.
6 The following conceptualization of corporate governance is taken from Nölke/Overbeek/Van Apeldoorn 2003, 
section 11, page 2.
7 For a similar argument regarding the difﬁculties of importing selected mechanisms of the German model within 
the French context cf. Boyer 1997: 92f.
8 There are some obvious parallels between the discussion on transnational private authority and the early discussion 
on transnational relations in general. In case of the latter, a too broad and general approach towards the subject 
inhibited the development of a coherent alternative to state-centric approaches, cf. Risse-Kappen 1995: 7f, 14f.
9 Compare this assumption with the observation made by Cutler/Hauﬂer/Porter 1999c: 345, taking into account 
the close relationship between legitimacy and authority: “Two distinct roles played by power in private authority 
can be discerned: The ﬁrst, ex ante consideration, is the role of power in making it possible for ﬁrms to establish 
private authority in the ﬁrst place… The second, an ex post consideration, is the importance of the power produced 
by private authority once it is established. Actors with power create private authority, and private authority creates 
power”.
10 This section partially draws on Nölke 1997, 1998.
11 The following examples focus on the case of Germany. Lannoo 1999: 287-291 provides a comprehensive 
European perspective.
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